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7 June 1982

REFERENCE: D/ICS Memorandum dated 1 June 1982, "Status of Former PFIAB Recommendations"

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON ISSUE NO. 2

1. The emphasis by the PFIAB in 1975 and 1976 on competitive analyses was a response to some of the same concerns which prompted the establishment of the NIO system for producing national intelligence; namely, that producers of intelligence had developed a certain mind set, that their judgments were based on underlying assumptions common to intelligence producers and consumers and that production procedures did not give sufficient recognition to sharply divergent points of view. While the NIOs had made progress in correcting these deficiencies, the A Team-B Team experiment promoted by the PFIAB serve to focus more attention on the problem.

2. At present, we regard independent assessments on important foreign developments as an essential part of the intelligence production process. Such assessments provide the basis for presentation of uncertainties, differing interpretations and alternative findings in national intelligence.

--Competitive analysis in the format of the "A Team-B Team" experiment of 1976 can be useful in some instances. In that experiment a group of outside experts were asked to make the best case possible for positions different from those of the Intelligence Community. Such analyses can be informative but they cannot substitute for national intelligence which is the end product of a number of analyses and conveys the most objective findings possible along with uncertainties.

--The production of intelligence by the Intelligence Community is inherently a competitive process. Intelligence on foreign developments produced to support departmental missions covers most of the same topics as intelligence produced by CIA to support the DCI. Interpretations of evidence and findings in Departmental Intelligence sometimes differ from the interpretations and findings of CIA. These independent or competitive assessments are used in the national intelligence production process in attempting to arrive at most likely judgments about foreign developments.

3. We have found that independently-produced, competing analyses, whether they reach common or different findings, are most useful in the following types of assessments:

- New weapon systems that could have important implications for US security such as ABM systems, ASW sensors or ballistic missiles.
- Implications of complex and conflicting indications of important foreign weapon programs, policies or intentions.

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4. Competing analyses wherein agencies or analysts marshall all the evidence to support a particular hypothesis have more limited application. Some topics that have been subjected to this type of analysis have had useful results:

--In the A Team-B Team experiment--Soviet strategic objectives, ICBM accuracies and air defenses.

--Possible explanations for Soviet developments considered to be enigmas, such as the nature of the activity at Advance Research and Development Facility No. 2 at the Soviets' Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test center.

5. There are few areas in which independent, competitive interpretations and analyses would not be useful, whether they reach the same or different conclusions. Least useful are different and competing findings about foreign developments, none of which are well supported by evidence and analysis, for example, the differing findings about Soviet civil defense in 1974 and 1975. Even in this case the competing views, while poorly supported substantively, served to stimulate development of a comprehensive collection, research and production program to fill important gaps in our understanding of Soviet civil defense. Once the gaps were filled most of the differences about the subject were resolved.

6. Actions have been taken which give greater assurance that competing viewpoints are articulated in finished intelligence reaching policymakers.

--The DCI has given special emphasis to alternative<sup>views</sup> and has encouraged competing estimates. He has insisted that NIEs contain explicit statements of uncertainty and that estimates convey the implications of their findings on United States policy.

--In NIE 11-3/8-81, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through 1991" we have given greater emphasis to communicating uncertainties and differing agency analyses.

--Greater use has been made of in-house panels of experts and expert consultants from outside the Intelligence Community to review and comment on drafts of important national intelligence issuances.

--Personnel from agencies other than CIA have been more frequently called upon to draft national intelligence.

1 June 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

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SUBJECT: Status of Former PFIAB Recommendations

REFERENCE: Memo from D/ICS to Distribution, Same Subject, dated  
25 May 1982 (TS-820528/1)

1. Leo Cherne has asked that we provide the status of Community activities on a group of issues in addition to those you have already been asked to address.

2. Attached is a letter from then PFIAB Chairman Cherne to the President, dated 3 December 1976, and the Summary of PFIAB's Activities which accompanied it (Attachment 1). We now need to comment on the five issues selected by the PFIAB for inclusion in this summary report. At least one of the subjects--the need for a national counterintelligence policy--is already being addressed. At this time, I would like to ask the Community Counterintelligence Staff to prepare a short statement on how far we have come in the last six years on Issue 1, Soviet Intercept of U.S. Telecommunications Links; and, working with the Security Committee, on Issue 4, Legal and Constitutional Issues. I think describing the establishment of the Foreign Surveillance Court will be sufficient for this issue.

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3. Attachment 2 includes four issues that the PFIAB identified in its 2 December 1976 study, "Intelligence for the Future," (only relevant excerpts are provided). The staffs listed below should address these subjects as succinctly as possible. The heading of the section which includes the first two issues is stated in the form of a question: "What Will the Intelligence System Need in Order That It be Capable of Responding to These Requirements?"

- o D - Search for Vulnerability - IPC
- o E - Tapping the Economic Expertise of the Private Sector - IPC

TS-820551  
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SUBJECT: Status of Former PFIAB Recommendations

4. The last two issues are in a section of the 2 December paper entitled, "What Conceptual and Technological Innovations Should be Pursued Most Vigorously; Which Among Them Will Most Significantly Affect the Intelligence Requirements and the Ability of the System to Adequately Respond?"

- o An Intelligence Estimates Evaluation Committee should be made a permanent body of the PFIAB, with a rotating membership - NIC (This suggestion comes at the end of a three-page discussion of NIEs that has already been provided to the NIC.)
- o Communications and Computer Security - IIHC

5. It would be helpful if we could have the responses called for in this memorandum by Tuesday, 8 June. That will allow me to prepare a consolidated response for the DCI's signature by 10 June. The DCI has agreed that we will forward the comments to Leo Cherne in sets, rather than wait until all the responses have been completed. We still plan to provide answers to most of the original questions by the end of this week. Let me repeat my offer, if you or your staffs have any questions, feel free to contact me or

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6. I have spoken with Leo Cherne and do not anticipate receiving any additional questions.

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Attachments:

1. TS-820266 dated 3 December 1976
2. Four Issues Identified in PFIAB Report dated 2 December 1976

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